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Abstract—Heterogeneous and dynamic IoT environments re-
quire a lightweight, scalable, and trustworthy access control sys-
tem for protection from unauthorized access and for automated
detection of compromised nodes. Recent proposals in IoT access
control systems have incorporated blockchain to overcome inher-
ent issues in conventional access control schemes. However, the
dynamic interaction of IoT networks remains uncaptured. Here,
we develop a blockchain based Trust and Reputation System
(TRS) for IoT access control, which progressively evaluates and
calculates the trust and reputation score of each participating
node to achieve a self-adaptive and trustworthy access control
system. Trust and reputation are explicitly incorporated in the
attribute-based access control policy, so that different nodes
can be assigned to different access right levels, resulting in
dynamic access control policies. We implement our proposed
architecture in a private Ethereum blockchain comprised of a
Docker container network. We benchmark our solution using
various performance metrics to highlight its applicability for IoT
contexts.
Index Terms—blockchain, IoT, trust management, reputation,
access control, authorization
I. INTRODUCTION
Access control, or authorization, is designed to limit the
actions and operations an authenticated user can perform on a
computer system [1]. By enforcing restrictions on user actions,
access control aims to prevent security breaches that may lead
to the exposure of important resources to unwanted adver-
saries. An example of a popular and widely used authorization
scheme is OAuth [2], which provides secure delegated third-
party access. In this scheme, access to resources is protected
by a centralized entity on behalf of the resource owner.
Within the context of IoT, conventional access control must
be tailored to match the specific requirements of IoT. It is com-
monly known that IoT devices are resource-constrained, e.g.
limited energy, memory capacity, and computational power.
Hence, access control mechanisms designed for IoT should
avoid using computationally expensive and memory intensive
operations. Instead, access protocols based on simpler sig-
nature and hashing operations are required. Furthermore, a
typical IoT deployment involves a large number of sensor
and actuator nodes, making scalability another key issue to
consider. IoT access control protocols must also be flexible to
accommodate the dynamic nature of the system and hetero-
geneity of the devices.
There has been an increasing trend towards utilizing
blockchain in access control for IoT [3]–[10]. Researchers
argue that salient features of blockchain, for instance de-
centralization and immutability, have the potential to over-
come unsolved inherent issues in conventional access control,
such as single point of failure and lack of transparency.
For instance, in [9], blockchain is used as a distributed and
immutable storage of access control policies. Smart contracts
in blockchain are also used to deliver secure and transparent
access control using static access right validations defined
in access policies [5]. However, little attention has been
aimed towards incorporating trust management in decentral-
ized access control. In fact, due to scalability and dynamic
interactions of IoT nodes in a network with intensive data
streams and interactions, it is imperative to build a dynamic
and flexible authorization system. Ideally, an automated Trust
and Reputation System (TRS) would observe the behavior
of every participating node by progressively quantifying its
behavior to a trust or reputation score. As a result, benign and
misbehaving nodes are associated with high and low reputation
score, respectively. The TRS would extend current access
control scheme, where trust and reputation are incorporated
in the access control policy to achieve dynamic authorization
system. To optimally utilize blockchain technology, the TRS
should leverage the advantages offered by blockchain, such as
pseudonymity, transparency, secure collaborative computation,
and non-repudiation in transactions.
In this paper, we incorporate trust management in
blockchain-based IoT authorization systems to achieve decen-
tralized, secure, and trustworthy access control. We use smart
contracts to replace centralization and to deliver transparent
processing. In the context of large-scale IoT access control,
the requester and requestee are best represented as attributes
rather than actual identities [11]. We model our access control
scheme as an Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [1].
Trust and reputation values are the additional attributes for
access request validation. By combining trust and reputation
with inherent attributes of IoT nodes, e.g., hardware and
software/firmware specification, and device ownership, we can
prevent colluding nodes from building false reputations to gain
access to protected resources. In our definition, trust is a sub-
jective view of a node’s behavior based on its previous interac-
tions, independently calculated by each node in the network.
On the other hand, reputation is a global view of a node’s
past behavior from aggregated trust relationships in other
nodes [8], calculated transparently by the smart contracts. We
adopt Gompertz function for trust value calculation [12] and
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formulate a reputation score for global trust computation. Pro-
gressive trust and reputation evaluation may effectively help
to detect and eliminate malicious or compromised nodes in
the network [13]. By incorporating blockchain technology and
signature-based detection, our proposed TRS is designed to
be robust against manipulations of unauthorized or malicious
entities. Furthermore, we also incorporate blockchain events
as a way to propagate and notify peers in case of access
violations. The TRS is designed to be blockchain-agnostic
and can be implemented in any blockchain instantiation with
adequate support for smart contract execution.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
• We design a lightweight TRS for decentralized IoT access
control. We use smart contracts to ensure the transparency
and reliability of the system. By progressively evaluating
the trust and reputation of nodes, TRS captures the dy-
namics of an IoT deployment, and detects and eliminates
corrupt or malicious nodes in the network.
• We incorporate blockchain events as a method to auto-
matically notify peers in case of access control violations.
As the events propagate, proper actions and mitigation
can be executed to prevent unwanted consequences from
corrupt or malicious nodes.
• We develop a proof-of-concept implementation of our
proposed framework in a private Ethereum network. To
demonstrate the applicability of our framework in the IoT
context, we use four benchmark metrics, e.g., latency, gas
consumption, and reputation and trust evolution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we summarize related works. Section III describes our pro-
posed architecture. We present our proof-of-concept imple-
mentation in Section IV. Section V discusses the limitations
of our framework and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
To date, several works have proposed decentralization in
IoT access control, which primarily aim to remove trusted
and centralized processing. Pinno et. al. [4] proposed a
fully decentralized access control in IoT with four separate
blockchains that work together, namely context, accountability,
relationships, and rules. Information about entities and autho-
rization rules is stored as blockchain transactions, in which
three types of access control mechanisms are supported, i.e.,
Access Control List (ACL), capability-based, and attribute-
based access control. In [6], authors proposed decentralized
attribute-based authorization scheme, in which authorization
and revocation of attributes are recorded in blockchain trans-
actions. Access control is enforced by the resource owner
and attributes validation is performed by using blockchain
search. However, both works [4], [6] do not optimally utilize
all capabilities offered by blockchain and primarily operate on
off-chain processes, e.g., no smart contracts are implemented.
The ACL also does not perform optimally on a network with
dynamic and large number of connected devices, as the ACL
must be manually updated to keep track of joining and leaving
nodes.
Recently, a number of studies have incorporated smart
contracts to deliver decentralization of access control in IoT.
In [5], the authors replaced central authenticator with smart
contracts, including access control contracts, a single judge
contract, and a single register contract. An ACL is stored in
the smart contract to record subject-object-action relationships.
The smart contract authenticates and authorizes a requester by
checking whether the requester has the access right according
to the ACL. Novo proposed to utilize a single smart contract to
enforce access control in a private blockchain [3], in which all
permitted access operations are recorded in the smart contract.
The managers of IoT devices are responsible to authorize
requesters by calling a function in the smart contract to
validate the requests against predefined ACL. In [14], authors
introduced the concept of Delegation of Trust (DoT) as a proof
of authorization to certain resources in a namespace stored in
a blockchain. DoTs are issued by the smart contracts, which
incorporate identity based encryption. All above works [3], [5],
[14] use smart contracts to replace centralized processing and
enable transparent access control, but all are unable to capture
the dynamics that are inherent in large IoT ecosystems.
Recent research has explored the inclusion of trust in
IoT access control. Bernabe et. al. [15] built a trust model
as an additional layer of security in a Trust-aware Access
Control Mechanism for IoT (TACIoT) system. The trust is
calculated in a fuzzy fashion by a central trust manager
and is used for validation during each authorization process.
Mahalle et. al. [16] proposed a Fuzzy Trust Based Access
Control (FTBAC) that maps trust scores to certain access
permissions of a resource with the principle of least privilege.
Each node in the network periodically calculates trust score
of its neighboring nodes based on experience, knowledge,
and recommendation. In [8], authors proposed a three-way
handshaking protocol for access control, in which the requester
and requestee agree upon certain terms and obligations on
accessing a resource. The terms and obligations examine the
requestee global reputation, which is stored on the blockchain.
Although trust is incorporated in [15], [16] as an additional
layer of security, trusted and centralized processing units
are still present. The blockchain based solution [8] is rather
complex and involves complicated and inefficient mechanism,
which renders it to be unsuited for IoT.
In summary, previous studies on decentralized IoT access
control/authorization are unable to address dynamic behavior
of IoT deployment. Furthermore, little attention has been de-
voted to provide a secure trust management for access control
in IoT. In this paper, we propose a TRS in decentralized IoT
access control system to provide trustworthy access control
and automated malicious node detection.
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we outline our proposed system architecture
and describe the access control mechanism along with the
blockchain-based TRS. We propose blockchain network as the
main actor for authorization and trust management to achieve
a secure, trustworthy, and transparent access control.
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Fig. 1. Architecture overview.
A. Architectural Components
Fig. 1 depicts the main components of our architecture
which include: IoT devices, data storage, attribute authority,
and the blockchain network. We use a smart building appli-
cation as a use case, but we design our architecture to be
application agnostic and capable of being adopted to other
IoT scenarios. Next, we describe these components in detail.
1) IoT devices: The IoT devices correspond to any nodes
in an IoT deployment, such as smart locks, security cameras,
smart meters, and other connected devices deployed in a smart
building. The nodes include the Service Providers (SP s), e.g.,
temperature sensors, which own resource r controlled as per
access policy P , and the Service Consumers (SCs), e.g.,
air-conditioner maintenance operator devices, which consume
resource r. IoT nodes with limited computational capabil-
ity, connect to the blockchain network via gateways, while
nodes with adequate computational power, i.e., to perform
asymmetric cryptography, connect to the blockchain network
directly [17]. Both SP and SC are identifiable by their Public
Keys (PKs).
2) Data storage: An SP may store data temporarily in its
local memory, while a dedicated off-chain data storage stores
high volume of data over a longer timespan. To access the
data, SC sends an access request to the dedicated data storage
after obtaining an authorization token. We describe the access
control scheme in more detail in Section III-D.
3) Attribute Authority: In our architecture, an Attribute
Authority (AA) is in charge of issuing legitimate attributes to
each IoT node. In a large scale IoT deployment, IoT nodes
are best described in terms of attributes rather than their
actual identities [11]. Thus, we store IoT devices’ attributes
(e.g., sensor types, role, and hardware specifications) on the
blockchain rather than their real identities. Note that, in our
architecture, the AA is not responsible for policy assignment
and access control mechanism. The policy assignment is
managed by SP , while access control mechanism is enforced
by the smart contract. Within the context of a smart building,
the AA is managed by the building manager who manages the
building specification in which technical sensor deployments
are described. The AA is identified by its Public Key PKAA.
We discuss attributes in more detail in Section III-B.
4) Blockchain network: We use a blockchain network for
decentralizing access control, by managing the associated
transactions and running the access control logic. This pro-
vides higher scalability, better security, and eliminates a single
point of trust and failure compared to common centralized
access control mechanisms. Furthermore, we compose three
main smart contracts, namely Attribute Provider (CTRAP ),
Trust and Reputation System (CTRTRS), and Policy Contract
(CTRpol), to automate the execution of attribute validation,
trust calculation, and access policy validation, respectively.
We design our architecture to be blockchain agnostic, which
complies with any blockchain implementation that supports
smart contract execution.
B. Attributes and Policies
An SC must register its attributes to the AA prior to
requesting access to a resource. An attribute αmi of SCi is
denoted as:
αmi = 〈key, type, val〉 (1)
where key, type, and val correspond to the name, type,
and value of the attribute, respectively. An SCi may have a
set of M attributes, Ai = {α1i , α2i , ..., αMi }, which defines
its characteristics. SC uses an off-chain secure channel to
send attribute registration request to AA, and sign the request
with its secret key SKSC for authentication purpose. After
receiving the request, AA verifies the attributes according to
the smart building specifications to prevent attribute forgery.
Once the verification is completed, AA stores the attributes in
the blockchain by initiating a registration transaction:
TXreg = [Ai|SigSC |timestamp|SigAA] (2)
where SigSC and SigAA are the signatures of SC and AA,
respectively. SigAA is proof that the transaction was initiated
by the AA. The TXreg transaction is handled by CTRAP
and is stored on the blockchain as a key value pair. Note
that, we assume that there is no privacy issue associated with
these attributes, as they are assumed to be publicly available
in the smart building specifications and the AA does not store
a direct binding between entities and their real identities.
To explicitly define the eligibility for accessing a resource,
a Service Provider (SP ) needs to define an access policy P ,
which expresses a Boolean rule set that can evaluate several
attributes. The SP has the authority to define, update, and
revoke the access policies. An SP may allow an SC to
perform a set of actions τ ⊂ {read,write, stream} on a
resource r in a context c, if SC satisfies policy Pr,c, which is
expressed as:
Pr,c = 〈Ap, cp, τp, Repmin〉 (3)
where Ap = {αp,1, .., αp,n} is the set of required attributes,
cp = 〈t, l〉 is the set of contexts (time and access throughput
limit) and Repmin is the minimum reputation value. The SP
is required to initiate transaction TXpol to create and store
the policy in CTRpol, which is defined as:
TXpol = [rp|τp|Ap|Repmin|cp|timestamp|SigSP ] (4)
where timestamp, and SigSP correspond to the policy cre-
ation time, and signature of SP , respectively.
C. Trust and Reputation System
Generally, a Trust and Reputation System (TRS) evalu-
ates the trustworthiness of participating nodes in a particular
system to capture the dynamics of the network. Our TRS
also aims to enhance access control security by detecting and
eliminating malicious or compromised nodes. We refer to trust
as a subjective local belief that a node will behave normally,
while reputation refers to a global view of a node’s previous
behavior. In this section, we describe how our lightweight and
transparent TRS mechanism works.
The trust value of an SCi by SPj , denoted as Ti,j , is calcu-
lated by SPj from its previous interactions with SCi, which
may be positive or negative. Positive interaction corresponds to
honest action of SCi, while negative interaction is otherwise.
If SPj has no previous interaction with SCi, Ti,j will be
assigned to a default value of 0. The trust value is calculated
when SCi requests an access to a resource r of SPj . Note that,
SPj is responsible for storing and progressively evaluating
trust values across different nodes in the network.
We adopt the trust concept in [12] to calculate the trust value
of Ti,j , in which the Gompertz function is used to model the
trust growth. As in real-life social interactions, trust increases
gradually by positive experience in interactions and drops
significantly by a negative experience. We also consider recent
interactions to be more relevant than previous interactions. In
addition to Gompertz growth function, we introduce an ageing
function, which assigns higher weights for recent interactions
and lower weights for past interactions. The ageing function
of n-th interaction In is formulated as follows:
In =
n∑
i=1
γ(n−i)δi (5)
δi =
{
δpos if positive interaction
δneg otherwise
(6)
where γ(n−i) is the ageing parameter, where 0 < γ < 1, and
δi corresponds to the weight of interaction with δneg < 0, and
δpos > 0. Note that, we set δpos < |δneg| so it is harder for
the SC to build trust than to lose it.
The output of Eq. 5 is fed to the Gompertz growth function
that limits the trust value from 0 (not trusted) to 1 (fully
trusted). The formula to calculate trust value Ti,j is formulated
as follows:
Ti,j (In) = a.e
−b.e−c.In (7)
where a, b, and c are the asymptote, the displacement param-
eter along x-axis, and the growth rate, respectively.
In contrast with trust, which is a subjective view of nodes’
behavior, reputation is a global view, which is built by
aggregating SCi interactions from multiple SP s. The repu-
tation of an SCi, Repi, is recorded in the blockchain and
is progressively evaluated by the trust and reputation smart
contract CTRTRS , when trustworthy interaction is recorded
or malicious behavior is reported.
In our scheme, reputation value must also consider the
variation of communicating counterparts of SCi. That way,
node SCi may not be able to conceivably build deceptive
reputation by only interacting with a single SP . To build
high reputation value, SCi must have a trustworthy transaction
history from multiple SP s. Similar to trust calculation, we
consider recent interactions to be more relevant than previous
ones. The reputation of SCi on its n-th interaction is calculated
as follows:
Repi,n =
(
n∑
t=1
βt.λ
−(n−t)
)
ln (Npeers) (8)
βt =
{
βpos if positive interaction
βneg otherwise
(9)
where βt is the weighting parameter with βneg < 0 and βpos >
0, λ−(n−t) is the decaying parameter (i.e., 0 < λ < 1), and
Npeers represents number of interacted peers. We set βpos <
|βneg| so that it is more difficult to gain reputation than to
lose it.
D. Access Control Scheme
Access control policy is enforced by CTRpol in the
blockchain. CTRpol evaluates an access request on whether
the set of requester’s attributes satisfy certain Boolean attribute
expressions in the policy for resource r. Note that, trust and
reputation value are also part of the attributes. The process
starts when an SCi requests access for a resource rj,k of SPj .
SCi may send an access request directly to the SPj or via the
smart contract CTRpol. Upon successful validation, CTRpol
issues an access token containing access details (e.g., token
expiration and access limits). The token can be used to re-
access the resource prior to expiration time, without the need
of repeating the access request process, which improves the
latency. Any violations of access request are also recorded in
blockchain by CTRTRS . The following subsections elaborate
on the system setup, access control mechanism, and malicious
behavior reporting in more detail.
1) System Setup: The smart building manager initially
deploys all mandatory smart contracts, e.g., Attribute Provider
(CTRAP ), Trust and Reputation Contract (CTRTRS), and
Policy Contract (CTRPol) to the blockchain. Recall that an
SP may refer to an IoT gateway SPgt or an independent
IoT node SPnd. Initially, each SPgt performs device and
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Fig. 2. Resource access via Service Provider.
resource discovery to map associated IoT nodes and their
specific resources. The process is carried out according to
specifications in low level routing and networking protocols
for IoT [18]. SPgt stores the mapping results G(r, nid), where
r is the resource and nid is the node ID, in the local resource
database. Both SCgt and SCnd may need to coordinate with
data storage for long term storage of the data. Once available
resources are identified, both SPgt and SPnd construct and
register corresponding policies, described in Section III-B.
By the end of the system setup process, all smart contracts
are deployed, and policies are constructed and stored in the
blockchain.
2) Authorization via service provider: We show the process
of access request via a service provider in Fig. 2. The process
involves getting the access token from the SP , and collecting
the data from the data storage. In this scenario, we assume
that the SCi has already obtained information about SPj and
the resource identifier. We also assume that both SP and SC
have sufficient computational power to perform asymmetric
cryptography.
• Step 1: The SCi sends a request to SPj for an access to
a resource r with action τ by sending a message R in a
secure channel, which is defined as:
R = 〈r, τ, S, SigSC〉 (10)
where r is the resource identifier, S = EncPKSP (k)
is a session key k encrypted by public key of service
provider PKSP , and SigSC = SigSKSc(Hash(R)) is
the signature of the request message, which is used for
authentication.
• Step 2: The SP forwards R to CTRpol for policy
validation by initiating a transaction TXR, which is
defined as:
TXR = [R|SigSP ] (11)
where SigSP is the signature of the SP .
• Step 3a and 3b: To validate the request, CTRpol obtains
the attributes and reputation of SCi by calling attribute
check to CTRAP (3a) and reputation check to CTRTRS
(3b). Access request validation is performed according to
Algorithm 1.
• Step 4: Upon successful validation, CTRpol issues
TokenR, which is defined as:
TokenR = 〈Repi, ExpR, l, t〉 (12)
where Repi is the reputation of SCi, ExpR is the token
expiration time, l is the access throughput limit, and t
is timestamp. CTRpol sends TokenR to SPj for final
access decision. If CTRpol observes repeated access,
in which attributes or reputation value does not satisfy
policy Pr, CTRpol reports this as a malicious activity to
the CTRTRS .
• Step 5a and 5b: The SPj finalizes the token based on a
decision function g:
Decisioni,k = g[Ti,j , Repi] (13)
Note that, in this scheme, SPj has the full authority
to grant or deny the access request. When function g
grants access to SCi, SPj finalizes the process by signing
TokenR using its private key, σ = SigSKSPj (TokenR)
and storing it in the blockchain via CTRTRS and sending
σ to SCi. At this point, SCi is authorized to access the
resource.
• Step 6, 7, and 8: To collect the data from resource r,
SCi sends a message 〈σ,R〉 to the data storage. Data
storage validates 〈σ,R〉 to CTRTRS to prevent access
token forgery. Upon successful validation, data storage
sends Enck(Data), data encrypted by session key k to
SCi.
Algorithm 1 Access Control Check
Input: Pr,c, TXR, Repi, and Ai
Output: TokenR or ∅
1: authorized← 0
2: if Ap ⊂ Ai then
3: if τ ⊂ τp then
4: if Repi ≥ Repmin then
5: authorized← 1
6: end if
7: end if
8: end if
9: if authorized then
10: return TokenR ← 〈Repi, ExpR, l, t〉
11: else
12: return ∅
13: end if
3) Authorization via Smart Contract: In contrast to access
request via service provider, access via smart contract is a
relaxed setting, in which SP ignores Eq. 13 and relies solely
on the reputation of the SCi calculated by CTRTRS . Hence,
SCi may obtain the TokenR with lower latency. As SPj is
not involved in this scheme, SPj may be offline temporarily
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Fig. 3. Resource access via smart contract.
to save energy. We illustrate the process of access request via
smart contract in Fig. 3.
• Step 1: Unlike authorization via service provider, SC
directly initiates TXR to CTRpol. In this scenario, TXR
is similar to Eq. 11 but without SigSPj .
• Step 2a and 2b: Policy contract validates TXR against
policy Pr by calling attribute check to CTRAP (2a)
and reputation check to CTRTRS (2b). Policy check is
performed according to Algorithm 1.
• Step 3a and 3b: Upon successful validation, CTRpol
issues TokenR by storing it in CTRTRS (3a) and
sending it to SCi. At this stage, SCi is authorized to
access resource r. If the validation fails, CTRpol records
it to CTRTRS .
• Step 4, 5, and 6: To collect the data from resource r, SCi
sends TokenR to the dedicated data storage. The data
storage validates TokenR to CTRTRS to prevent access
token forgery. Upon successful validation, data storage
sends Enck(Data), data encrypted by session key k to
SCi.
4) Handling Malicious Behavior: Recall in our definition
of trust and reputation that SP is responsible for keeping track
and progressively evaluating the trust value across different
nodes, while CTRTRS is in charge of progressively evaluating
and storing reputation values across participating nodes. In
the authorization process, CTRpol validates if SC violates
access policy P . Meanwhile, in the access token validation
process, dedicated data storage checks if the TokenR is
invalid. Any violations are reported as a malicious behavior to
CTRTRS and recorded securely on the blockchain. CTRpol
then initiates an event by which SP uses to update the
reputation and blacklist the corresponding node. Note that, all
SP s are notified of malicious activities by the CTRpol.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section describes the proof-of-concept implementation
of our proposed architecture in a private Ethereum network.
To illustrate the feasibility of our architecture, we divide the
performance evaluation into four parts: (1) delay analysis, (2)
smart contract evaluation, (3) reputation evolution, and (4)
trust value evolution.
A. Implementation
We implemented our proposed architecture on a MacBook
Pro laptop (8GB RAM, 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU, MacOS
10.14.6). We built a private Ethereum network using Docker1
to simulate a real-world network, in which each peer and miner
run geth v1.9.6 to manage the network. We used Python
v3.7.4 scripts to simulate the interactions among nodes, web3
v5.2.0 library for communicating with Ethereum peers, and
py-solc v3.2.0 library for compiling the smart contracts.
To mimic resource constraints in IoT devices, we limit the
CPU cycles of all peers to 0.25 (25% of available processing
time) [19].
All smart contracts are written in Solidity v0.5.11 [20],
a Turing complete object oriented language for Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM). Solidity has native support for com-
puting and verifying hashes efficiently [11]. However, com-
plex function execution in Solidity may cost a considerable
amount of Gas. Moreover, Solidity v0.5.11 only supports basic
computation in integers and does not support floating point
computation [20]. We changed Eq. 8 so that Repi ∈ Z, i.e.,
all reputations are stored as integers.
As blockchain is immutable, the smart contract update
mechanism works by flagging the old smart contract as
obsolete2, and deploying a new smart contract. To facilitate
secure smart contract updates, we separate logic and data
into different smart contracts. The main smart contract, which
contains all functions for the access control and TRS logic,
does not store data and connects to the secondary contract
to collect and store data. This way, when a selfdestruct
method is called and a new smart contract is deployed, the
old smart contract becomes unusable but the old data remains
accessible to the new smart contract. This is important when
a bug is discovered and an update is necessary.
Note that we selected private Ethereum blockchain as the
implementation platform to show that our solution works
for both permissioned and permission-less blockchains. How-
ever, our proposed architecture can be implemented in any
blockchain instantiation that supports smart contract execution,
for instance Hyperledger Fabric and Sawtooth.
B. Results
1) Delay Analysis: Recall that in Section III-D, an SC may
request an access via SP or CTRpol smart contract. In this
evaluation, we are interested in seeing the effect of having
multiple access requests simultaneously for both via an SP
or CTRpol. Latency is the time required for an SC to be
authorized. We conducted an experiment in which up to 15
concurrent requests are performed. We repeated the experiment
30 times. We plot the result in Fig. 4.
As described in Section III-D, authorization request via
SP involves more steps, in which the SP must acknowledge
and finalize each request by executing Eq. 13 and signing
1https://www.docker.com/products/docker-desktop
2In Ethereum, it is performed by calling the predefined selfdestruct
method.
TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF GAS USED AND ELAPSED TIME FOR CONTRACT DEPLOYMENTS AND FUNCTION CALLS.
Methods Type Gas Used Elapsed Time (ms)Method Contract Min Max Average Min Max Average
- CTRAP Ctr. depl. - - 655 608.00±0.00 1332.3 18 574.65 5724.71±4.08K
- CTRpol Ctr. depl. - - 1 654 067.00±0.00 1331.91 12 074.71 5078.07±2.83K
- CTRTRS Ctr. depl. - - 1 036 234.00±0.00 1158.60 14 877.57 5367.94±3.12K
regAttr CTRAP Func. call 159 014 174 078 159 575.86±2.69K 1031.16 9150.20 4784.21±1.89K
regPolicy CTRpol Func. call 303 422 318 422 303 922.00±2.69K 605.43 25 747.86 5795.94±5.38K
recMisbehavior CTRTRS Func. call 100 055 195 334 103 230.97±1.71K 1580.69 12 177.24 5092.43±2.65K
Fig. 4. Elapsed time for authorization.
TokenR using its private key. This incurs higher delay for
SP authorization requests. On the other hand, authorization
request via CTRpol reduces delay as the requests are directly
routed to the blockchain. This results in longer latency for
request via SP , especially when the number of concurrent
requests are high. The rate of increase in latency for contract-
based authorisation is much lower than the rate for SP-
based authorisation, showing that the smart-contract approach
increases scalability.
2) Smart Contract Evaluation: We measured the required
gas and elapsed time for deploying each mandatory smart
contract and calling three primary functions in each smart con-
tract: (1) regAttr for attribute registration, (2) regPolicy
for policy registration, and (3) recMisbehavior for misbe-
havior logging. In Ethereum, Gas cost depends on the number
of EVM opcodes involved when executing a function [21]. We
repeated the experiment 30 times and we summarize the result
in Table I.
The gas costs for smart contract deployments remain the
same for all repeated measurements whilst the gas costs for
each function call varied. Note that, gas costs are determined
by the number of low level operation (opcodes) required to
execute a function in the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).
Each opcode is associated with a gas cost, e.g., 3 gas for
ADD (addition) and 5 gas for MUL (multiplication). As the
arguments in each function call differ in size, which results
in the variation of EVM opcodes, the gas costs are dynamic.
Fig. 5. Reputation evolution.
However, as each contract deployment does not incur varia-
tion in EVM opcodes, so the gas costs remain static. Note
that, all costs associated with executing all functions are the
responsibility of SCs.
The elapsed time varies for both contract deployments and
function calls. The fastest deployment time is approximately
600 milliseconds, while the worst case may take up to 25
seconds. The elapsed time is measured from initiating the
transaction until the transaction is stored permanently on the
blockchain. In Ethereum, the signed transaction first goes to
the transaction pool prior to being appended to a block by a
miner. Note that there is no precise timing guarantee associated
with when a miner picks the signed transaction and appends
it to the blockchain. The uncertainty in this process causes
variations in elapsed time, as the signed transaction may be
directly picked and stored on the blockchain or stay in the
transaction pool until the next block generation.
3) Reputation Evolution: To observe the trends in reputa-
tion growth, we simulated benign node behavior and calculated
its trust value using Eq. 8 with different values of Npeers. We
set βpos and λ to 10 and 0.95, respectively. Recall that, in
Eq. 8 β sets the increase and decrease for each positive and
negative interaction and λ sets the growth rate or the y scaling.
We particularly set λ closer to 1 to achieve gradual growth.
We plot the result in Fig. 5.
As shown in Fig. 5 all reputation increases follow logarith-
mic growth and saturate proportionally at a certain value for
Fig. 6. Trust value evolution of 3 nodes trying to access rA of SPA.
all values of Npeers. The saturation point depends on Npeers,
i.e., higher Npeers causes saturation at higher reputation value.
In this scenario, reputation is designed to have no upper limits,
as widely used in online service provision [22]. On the other
hand, trust value ranges from 0 to 1.
4) Trust Evolution: To investigate the evolution of trust
value, we simulated three nodes accessing a resource rA of
SPA, two of which act maliciously during a certain time
epoch (# of interaction) over the total experiment length of 130
interactions. Node 2 begins to act maliciously from interaction
50 to 70, while node 3 from interaction 100 to 125. SPA
progressively calculated the trust value using both Eq. 5 and
Eq. 7 in each interaction. To set a gradual incline and to limit
trust from 0 to 1, we set the value of γ, a, b, and c to 0.95,
1, −6, and −0.1, respectively. We plot the results in Fig. 6.
To reach significant trust value, a node needs at least 30 to
40 benign interactions. On the other hand, losing significant
trust value only requires less than 10 malicious interactions,
i.e., see the shaded area in Fig. 6. Note that, as the trust growth
is modeled using Gompertz function, the trust will never reach
its maximum value, i.e., Tmax = 1.
As calculated by CTRTRS , the global reputation score of
node 2 and node 3 drop significantly, as an implication of
their malicious actions. Subsequently, CTRpol emits malicious
behavior events to notify other SP s about the malicious
actions of node 2 and node 3.
V. DISCUSSION
In our architecture, the adversaries are SCs who can
perform malicious actions by successively requesting access
and manipulating access token to collect data (e.g., using
forged and expired tokens and leveraging access rights). The
SP s are motivated to protect their resources from unwanted
access. So they perform signature and access token validation
accordingly. In future work, we plan to investigate the case
where SP s can be malicious or unreliable in data delivery.
All miners are bounded by cryptographic primitives of the
blockchain specifications, which prevents malicious miners to
take control over the blockchain network. We adopt the access
control matrix [1] to model access control. The model defines
a set of subjects, a set of objects, a set of resources, and
a set of actions, which correspond to SC, SP , r, and τ in
our scheme, respectively. We further assume that an anomaly
detection system is already present to protect the network.
In case where a node A wants to ruin node B’s reputation,
i.e., launch a bad mouthing attack, the request signature proves
the originality of the sender. Hence a node cannot simply use
tokens of other nodes to maliciously drop its reputation. Our
proposed scheme is also resilient to sybil attack, i.e., a node
trying to forge new identities to its advantage, and newcomer
attacks, i.e., a node trying to get a new identity to reset its
bad reputation. Both sybil and newcomer attacks are prevented
by the attribute registration scheme, where a node cannot re-
register itself to the attribute authority, as the latter records the
attributes relation with the actual device information.
In our framework, trust refers to SP ’s subjective view of a
node from its previous interactions, while reputation is a global
view of a node’s behavior. As both of the values are computed
using different formulas, i.e., Eq. 5 and 7 for trust, and Eq. 8
for reputation, and also calculated by different instance, we
expect that trust and reputation values for a single SC to vary
across the network. An implication of this is the possibility
that SPx does not incorporate negative interaction of SCz to
SPy in its trust calculation. However, this can be mitigated by
defense mechanisms explained in Section III-D4.
Our proposed framework has a few limitations. Recall in
Section IV-A, we separate logic and data implementation for
the smart contract. This scheme may help to enforce secure
smart contract upgrade, as the logic for smart contract can be
updated by marking a contract obsolete and deploying a new
contract, if bugs are discovered. However, this scheme does
not allow data structure updates. If the contract is updated,
the logic may change but the data structure remains the same.
Another limitation is that our framework only supports IoT
devices which have sufficient computational power to perform
asymmetric cryptography.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a trust management framework
for decentralized IoT access control system, which aims to
provide secure and trustworthy access control while being able
to detect and eliminate malicious and compromised nodes.
We incorporated trust and reputation in our proposed access
control mechanism, which are progressively evaluated in each
interaction. Our conceptual framework is blockchain agnos-
tic and can be implemented in any blockchain instantiation
that has sufficient support for smart contract execution. We
implemented a proof-of-concept implementation in a private
Ethereum network of docker containers to benchmark our
proposed architecture. Experimental results show that our
proposed framework only incurs small processing delays and
is feasible for trust management in decentralized IoT access
control.
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